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Brave New School: A Constitutional
Argument Against State-Mandated Mental
Health Assessments in Public Schools
"For you must remember that in those days ...children were always
brought up by their parents and not in State Conditioning Centres."'
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I. INTRODUCTION

When two seemingly harmless Colorado teenagers opened fire on
their classmates at Columbine High School, the previously private matter
of adolescent mental health became a question of public concern. Why
hadn't anyone realized how emotionally troubled Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold were? How many other invisible victims of psychological illness
were teetering on the brink of violence in American schools? One could
not help but wonder whether proper mental health care, provided in a
timely manner, might have averted the tragedy.2 Columbine seemed a
symbol of missed opportunity, a dramatization of the high cost of our

(1932).
2003).

1.

ALDous HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD, 32 (HarperCollins Publishers, 2004)

2.

Talk of the Nation: Youth and State III: Schools (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 13,
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collective failure to detect emotional illness in America's children.3 The
crisis called for state action.4
Within a year after Columbine, the United States Surgeon General had
convened a conference on juvenile mental health and published a weighty
report calling for the development of community-wide psychological health
services.5 Shortly thereafter, President George W. Bush issued the New
Freedom Commission on Mental Health, advocating universal mental
health screening from pre-school through adulthood.6 By 2001, a bill had
been introduced in Congress that, if passed, would authorize emotional
health assessment pilot programs to commence at selected educational
facilities. 7 What is more, though the role of government in mental health
determinations remains merely a subject of debate at the national level, the
Illinois legislature has already heeded the call to action by enacting the
Children's Mental Health Act of 2003, which mandates, in pertinent part,
emotional health assessments for children throughout Illinois public
schools. 8 Indeed, so confident was the Illinois Senate of the value and
propriety of increased state involvement in the provision of mental health
9
care that it passed the Children's Mental Health Act by a unanimous vote.
Yet when the government has a hand in assessing emotional health
there are potentially sinister consequences. One case in point is the story of
Patricia Weathers, a New York mother who was unceremoniously
informed by a school psychologist that her first-grade son had attention
deficit disorder for which he should be treated with stimulants. 10 When,
after an unsatisfactory trial run on Ritalin, Ms. Weathers chose to discontinue her son's use of the drug, the school reported her to Child Protective
Services for child abuse."
The charges against Ms. Weathers were
ultimately dropped,12 but the incident reveals the danger inherent in zealous

3.
4.

Id.

See id.

5.
Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General,
1999, at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/1ibrary/mentalhealth/home.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
6.
President's
New
Freedom Commission on
Mental Health, at
http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/reports.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
7.
Children's Mental Health Screening and Prevention Act of 2003, H.R. 3063,
108th Cong. § 3 (2003).

8.
Children's Mental Health Act of 2003, 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/15 (2003).
9.
Stephen Barlas, Illinois Passes Controversial Child Screening Plan,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Oct. 2004, available at

http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/p041001 a.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).

10.
Kelly Hearn, Some ParentsJust Say "Whoa" to School-Required Medications,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 14, 2004, at 12.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
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state involvement in the highly personal matter of a child's social and
meddling in the constitutionally
emotional development: governmental
3
protected realm of family relations. 1
This comment advances the argument that universal, school-based,
emotional health assessments, now the law in the state of Illinois, unconstitutionally intrude upon a parent's right to raise a child without undue
interference from the state.' 4 Part I traces the historical evolution of the
right to parental autonomy from its common law origin to its subsequent
transformation in the 1920s into a constitutionally protected right under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part H examines the
invocation of parental rights in the public school context during the past
fifty years, juxtaposing the broad success of parental claims in the 1970s
with the overwhelming failure of similar parental challenges in the 1990s.
Part III explores the possibility that the rising tide against parental rights in
the 1990s may have been stemmed by the celebrated, but quixotic, 2000
Supreme Court custody decision Troxel v. Granville.1 5 The final section
looks at in-school emotional health assessments in light of the reasoning of
Troxel and its progeny and suggests a constitutional approach for parents
who object to statutorily mandated emotional health assessments of their
children in public schools.
II. PARENTAL AUTONOMY:
FROM COMMON LAW TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND

Nowhere in the United States Constitution are parents expressly guaranteed the right to raise their children without governmental interference.
Yet, perhaps the absence of such a guarantee signifies not that the Framers
recognized no such right, but rather that they assumed it. At the time of the
Constitution's creation, a parent's interest in autonomous childrearing

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (reaffirming, by a plurality, the
13.
constitutionally protected right of parents' care, custody and control of their children under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
American courts refer to the fight in question as "the right to familial relations"
14.
in Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2003); "parental fights" in Littlefield v. Forney
Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001); the right "of parents to raise their children
as they see fit" in C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 319 F. Supp. 2d 483, 489 (D.N.J. 2004);
as well as by a number of other names. I have employed these terms and the more general
"right to parental autonomy" in this Comment.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
15.
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arguably belonged to that category of right "so generally admitted, and so
seldom contested"1 6 as to afford no opportunity for its assertion until it is
under siege.' 7 The parent-child relationship, perhaps more than any other
relationship, was so tightly woven into the fabric of Western culture that
constitutional assurances, had it even occurred to the Framers to make
them, would have seemed redundant and unnecessary.18 The individual
rights that the Framers elevated to constitutional status were quite naturally
those that seemed most vulnerable to government usurpation under the
English political and legal traditions that were transported to American
shores.' 9 Accordingly, the one familiar intrusion into the privacy of the
home-the stationing of troops within the home-did qualify for constitutional protection under the Third Amendment.2 ° Parental childrearing
rights (a veritable corollary to property rights) by contrast, already enjoyed
robust protection under the English common law traditions. 2' In one
commentator's colorful analogy, asserting that parents have an unassailable
right to control the upbringing of their children would have been as
absurdly obvious as insisting that parents have a right to clothe their
children.22
There is ample evidence of parental rights' solid common law foundation. No less than an entire chapter of William Blackstone's venerable
Commentaries on the Laws of England is dedicated to a discussion of the
interplay between family and the law.
Blackstone characterizes the
parent-child relationship as "the most universal relation in nature, ' 24 and
describes the "power of life and death ' 25 that a father had over his child
under Roman law.26 Blackstone concedes that the English approach is
somewhat less categorical than that of its Roman antecedent; 27 nonetheless,

16.
Capitol Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899) (referring to the right to
trial by jury).
17.
Daniel E. Witte, Comment, People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to
Recognizing a Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 BYU L.
REv. 183, 219.
18.
See id. at 218-19.
19.
See id. at 219.
20.
Id. at 219 n.150.
21.
See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1975).
22.
Joel S. Moskowitz, Parental Rights and State Education, 50 WASH. L. REv.
623, 623 (1975).
23.

1 WiLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *434.

24. Id.
25. Id. at *440.
26. Id. According to Blackstone, the authority of father over child under Roman
law rested on the principle that "he who gave had also the power of taking away." Id.
27. Id.
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the underlying principle that emerges from Blackstone's description of the
law's view of the family is that the nature of a parent's authority over a
child was such that the state could no sooner interfere with that relationship
than it could interfere with a private party's dominion over any other
chattel.28
This profound regard for parental authority has deep-seated historical
justifications-both socio-economic and cultural. American society, like
its English cousin, was largely agrarian, and children were conceived and
raised in no small part to serve as extra hands on the farm and to provide
for parents in their dotage.29 In other words, children had a distinctly
economic value to their parents. 30 However distasteful it might seem to
cast children as property in the eyes of the law, an unsentimental look at the
realities of rural life reveals the common sense behind the historical
analogy.
From a cultural standpoint, the power of parent over child had its roots
in an indisputable source of Western moral authority: the Hebrew Bible.3'
Among the Ten Commandments, the exhortation to honor one's father and
mother ranks fourth, preceded only by Commandments that concern man's
relationship to God, and placed ahead of the remaining Commandments
that dictate acceptable conduct in the community. 32 The implication is that
the parent-child relationship ranks somewhere between the spiritual world
and the temporal world.33 Indeed, contemporary judicial references to "the
God-given and constitutional right of a parent, 3 4 as well as such common
law characterizations of the parental right as "sacred" 35 expose the enduring
36
biblical underpinnings to the law's conception of parental authority.
Whether biblical and early English common law notions of parental
authority ought to in any way color our modern legal approach to the
family is certainly open to debate. However, at a minimum, it is undeniable that this was the cultural and legal landscape that informed the
Framers of the Constitution in determining which rights required constitu-

28.
29.

Earl M. Maltz, The Trouble with Troxel, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 695, 708-09 (2001).
See June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist

Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 966 (1991).

30.
See id. at 966 n.57.
31.
See Moskowitz, supra note 22, at 624 n.5.
32.
Exodus 20:12 (King James).
33.
Alessia Bell, Note, Public and Private Child: Troxel v. Granville and the
ConstitutionalRights of Family Members, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 225, 247 (2001).
34.
Nebraska ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 144 N.W. 1039, 1043 (Neb. 1914).
35.
Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights ", 1976 BYU L. REv. 605, 628.
36.
See Witte, supra note 17, at 219.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26

tional protection and 37which stood on sufficiently firm footing without
constitutional support.
It cannot even be said that there was any perception at common law
that parental authority was surrendered to the state when the child crossed
the threshold of a public school.3 8 This is abundantly borne out by
nineteenth century American case law.39 Prior to the advent of compulsory
education, American courts consistently upheld a parent's right (on
occasion on little more than a whim) to exempt a child from curricular
requirements n° In Morrow v. Wood, a father successfully challenged a
school geography requirement. 41 The Wisconsin court recognized no
diminution in parental authority in favor of the state premised on the
child's attendance at a state-run school.4 2 In the court's opinion, the parent

who chooses to send a child to public school nonetheless retains the fight to
determine what is best for
the child, and in no way "impliedly clothes the
43
teacher with that power.
In an Illinois decision, parents objected to their child's participation in
a bookkeeping class."a When the child, with her parents' blessings,
excused herself from the class, she was forthwith expelled from school.4 5
The student and her parents brought an action in trespass against the
school, challenging the school's authority to suspend the girl for declining
to attend a class.46 The Illinois Supreme Court refused to uphold the
suspension, reasoning that "law givers in all free countries ... have deemed
it wise to leave the education and nurture of the children of the State to the
direction of the parent or guardian. 47
Even after compulsory education laws went into effect, the common
law preference for parental over school authority survived.4 8 In State ex
rel. Sheibley v. School District No. 1, a Nebraska father sought to remove
his daughter from a grammar class solely on the arguably frivolous grounds
that he disapproved of the way the subject was being taught. 49 The
37.
Id. at 217-18.
38.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Sheibley v. Sch. Dist. No. I of Dixon County, 48 N.W.
393 (Neb. 1891).
39. See, e.g., Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (Wis. 1874).
40. Id.at 65.
41.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44.
Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567 (I11.1875).
45.
Id.at 569.
46.
Id.at 569-70.
47.
Id. at 573.
48.
Moskowitz, supra note 22, at 637.
49.
Sheibley, 48 N.W. at 394.
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Nebraska Supreme Court categorically rejected the school's contention that
school discipline and order would suffer if Anna Sheibley were permitted
to exempt herself from the class.5 ° Juxtaposing the father's enduring
concern for the welfare of his child with the teacher's less compelling
"temporary interest" 5' the Nebraska court recognized the father's superior
claim, and upheld his right to remove his daughter from the class.52 To
force the child to remain in the class against her father's wishes, the court
argued in language uncannily prophetic of later due process analysis,53
would be "arbitrary and unreasonable., 54 Although these words have the
familiar ring of mere rationality review, in Sheibley, as in the seminal
parental rights cases that would subsequently transform the parental
common law right into a constitutionally protected interest, they were used
in a kind of reverse rational basis test that favored individual right over
state prerogative.
Under reverse rational basis review, when state
legislation and parental wishes conflicted, it was the burden of the state to
show that the educational decision made by the parent was unreasonable.56
As long as the parent had a rational reason for her decision, courts would
champion that decision and protect it from incursions by the state legislature. Put another way, even legislation deemed reasonable in the abstract
would give way to arguably rational parental decisions when the two were
incompatible.5 8
B. THE METAMORPHOSIS FROM COMMON LAW TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The Nebraska judges who upheld Mr. Sheibley's right to remove his
daughter from a core course in a mandatory public school environment
made no reference to the United States Constitution.5 9 In 1891, when the
case was decided, there was no constitutional provision to which Mr.
Sheibley could turn when state legislation or school policy threatened to
override his judgments about his daughter's education.60 However, just a

50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 395.
52.
Id.
53.
Moskowitz, supra note 22, at 638.
54.
Sheibley, 48 N.W. at 395.
55.
Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children:A ParentalistManifesto, 63 U. CHI.
L. REv. 937, 1005 (1996).
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
See generally Sheibley, 48 N.W. at 393.
60.
Camille Waters, Note, A, B, C's and Condoms for Free: A Legislative Solution
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generation later, a parent's interest in controlling the education of his
children would be recognized as an implicit
right under the Due Process
6
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '
The Fourteenth Amendment promise that "[n]o [s]tate shall . . . de62
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"
initially understood merely as a guarantee of procedure,63 over time came
to be construed as an assurance of a host of substantive rights so basic to
liberty as to be implicitly protected against all but the most essential and
minimally intrusive legislation. 64 As early as the 1870s, even the Slaughter-House Cases' narrow interpretation of the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment 65 contained hints of the rationale behind substantive due
process percolating under the surface. In his dissenting opinion to that
case, Justice Bradley forcefully argued for Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation of fundamental principles of liberty rooted in English legal
traditions.6 6 By the 1900s, it was acknowledged by members of the Court
that certain fundamental rights predated the advent of government and were
implicitly protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 In Lochner v. New York, the controversial case that lent its name to
this maligned era of judicial activism, even the skeptic Justice Holmes
admitted in his dissent that the Constitution could not abide a statute that
infringed "fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law.",68 Among the Supreme Court
decisions that defined those "fundamental principles" deserving of
Fourteenth Amendment protection were two cases that pitted parental
rights against the authority of the state in the realm of public education.
The first public school parental rights case, Meyer v. Nebraska, concerned a Nebraska statute that forbade schools-both private and publicto teach any modem foreign language to any child who had not successfully passed the eighth grade. 69 It was feared that immigrant children,
instructed in their native German tongue, might, by dint of linguistic
to Parents'Rights and Condom Distributionin Public Schools, 31

(1997).

VAL.

U. L. REv. 787, 801

61.
See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) (standing for the
proposition that parents have a constitutional right to control the education of their children).
62.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63.
See Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1995).
64.
See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
65.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
66.
Id. at 111-24 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
67.
David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the
Originsof FundamentalRights Constitutionalism,92 GEO. L.J. 1, 37 (2003).
68.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
69.
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390.
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affinity, feel a continued allegiance to Germany. 70 A harbinger of the
modem-day English-only movement,7 ' the statute, part of the nationwide
"100 percent Americanism"7 2 campaign, sought to ensure that America's
celebrated "huddled masses" became patriotic, English-speaking American
citizens. 73 Similar anti-foreign language legislation could be found on the
books in twenty-two other states as well.74 When a Nebraska teacher was
charged and convicted of "the direct and intentional teaching of the
German language," 75 and the conviction was upheld by the Nebraska
Supreme Court,7 6 the United States Supreme Court reviewed the case,
focusing, in particular, on the right of parents to afford their children
instruction in German despite the contrary wishes of the state.7 7
The Supreme Court deemed the Nebraska statute an unconstitutional
usurpation of a parental right, asserting that the liberty guaranteed under
the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to "marry, establish a home
and bring up children. 7 8 Although the Court fully recognized the
permissibility of the state's expressed goal of encouraging patriotism, it
categorically refused to validate the means the state had chosen.7 9
"Perhaps," the Court declared, "it would be highly advantageous if all had
ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by
methods which conflict with the80 Constitution-a desirable end cannot be
promoted by prohibited means."
Just two years later, the Supreme Court was again asked to weigh in
on the proper parent/state balance of control over a child's education. In
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court considered the validity of
the Oregon compulsory education statute that mandated attendance at
public schools to the exclusion of private institutions. 81 Here again, the
Court found the Oregon statute unconstitutional because it "unreasonably

70.
William G.
Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical
Perspective, 57 U. CiN. L. REv. 125, 132 (1988).
71.
Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages,
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269 (1992) (discussing the
historical development of language laws in America).
72.
Ross, supra note 70, at 131.
73.
Id. at 134.
74.
Id. at 133.
75.
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397.
76. Id. at 391.
77.
Eric W. Schulze, The ConstitutionalRight of Parentsto Direct the Education of
Their Children, 138 EDUC. L. REp. 583, 584 (1999).
78. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
79.
Id. at 401.
80.
Id.
81.
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 514 (1925).
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interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control. 82 Without a "general power
of the [s]tate to standardize its children, 8 3 the elimination of the private
school option was necessarily unreasonable. At the same time, the Pierce
Court did acknowledge the power of the state to regulate schools, which
included the authority "to inspect, supervise and examine them, their
teachers and pupils. ' 84 Furthermore, the state has the right to require "that
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught., 85
After Pierce, it would seem clear that schools had unquestioned authority
to manage schools as they saw fit, and mandate attendance in civics
lessons.
Soon after the Meyer and Pierce decisions were handed down, People
ex. rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, a Colorado Supreme Court decision, explicitly
set forth a standard for the balance of authority between parent and public
school.86 Following the logic of Pierce, the Colorado Supreme Court held
that parents had a right to remove their children from any public education
class with the exception of those that taught good citizenship.8 7 Because
the father in this Colorado case had sought to remove his child from a
biology class, a course of study with no relationship to civic education, the
father's request was upheld. 88 Almost as if in anticipation of the controversies that would plague parents and public schools later in the century, the
Colorado Supreme Court insisted that parents had both the right to send
their children to public schools and to choose what their children would
study. 89 "The school board," the court states, "cannot make the surrender
of the second a condition of the enjoyment of the first."90
Although most of the substantive due process jurisprudence of the
Lochner era was repudiated by the Court by the end of the 1930s, 9' the
92
parental rights established by the Meyer and Pierce decisions survived.
Indeed, Meyer and Pierce would serve, in the 1960s and 1970s, as the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
Conrad v.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 534.
Id.
People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 255 P. 610 (Colo. 1927), overruled by
City of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982).
Id. at 614.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1176 (5th Cir. 1979).
Ross, supra note 70, at 179-80.
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foundation for the Court's personal liberties jurisprudence,93 establishing
the authority upon which the Court built its right to privacy in the
controversial Roe v. Wade. 94
As fundamental privacy rights jurisprudence matured, the Supreme
Court developed a tiered approach to resolving challenges to intrusive state
legislation.95 Under traditional standards of judicial review of state
legislation, a statute passes constitutional muster by simply bearing a
reasonable relationship to some permissible state goal.96 However, a
standard more stringent than mere rational basis review evolved for statutes
that touched upon rights deemed to be fundamental.9 7 In such cases,
statutes were to be subjected to strict scrutiny, a two-pronged test of
constitutionality requiring both a compelling
state interest and a narrowly
98
tailored means of achieving that interest.
Opponents of parental rights are quick to point out that there is no
mention of strict scrutiny in Meyer and Pierce, and that the standard
applied in these cases-and, by extension, the appropriate standard for all
subsequent parental rights claims-is a mere rational basis review. 99 It is
correctly noted, however, that contemporary due process tiered scrutiny
had not yet been enunciated by the Court when Meyer and Pierce were
decided, and that there is evidence in those decisions themselves to indicate
that the Court (though it lacked a name for its process) was applying
something with more bite than today's rational basis review.'(
The
additional bite that readers correctly perceive in Meyer and Pierce is the
implicit employment of the reverse rational basis standard that was
explicitly used in the Sheibley case. 0 1 Under this standard, even reasonable state legislation is irrational-and therefore unconstitutional-when it
coercively interferes with a parent's reasonable decision regarding the
raising of a child. 10 2 As a result of these conflicting readings, although it
was these parental rights cases that spawned the development of fundamental privacy rights jurisprudence, it remained unclear whether parental

93.
Id.
94.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
95.
Hemdon by Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174,
177 (4th Cir. 1996).
96. Id.
97.
Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
98.
Id.
99.
Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461 (2d Cir. 1996).
100.
Herndon, 89 F.3d at 178.
101.
See supra Part IA and note 55.
102.
Gilles, supra note 55, at 1005.
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autonomy itself should command
heightened judicial scrutiny or mere
10 3
modem day rational basis review.
I. PARENTAL RIGHTS FROM THE 1970S TO THE 1990S:
A DIMINISHING VALUE

However murky the Meyer/Pierce legacy might have been for parental
autonomy, during the 1960s and 1970s, the tension between parental rights
and school authority over children was resolved resoundingly and
consistently in favor of parents.' °4 Whether parents objected to controversial curricula or intrusive school regulations, courts were overwhelmingly
sympathetic to their claims. 0 5 In 1969, in the Seventh Circuit, a parent
successfully challenged the authority of the school to dictate appropriate
hair length for boys.'°6 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, in this case, the
parent of the boy had no objection to the length of the boy's hair and
refused to recognize the authority of the school to second-guess a decision
commonly arrived at within the family. 0 7
Similarly, in New Jersey in 1971, a family demanded the right to exempt their children from the mandatory sex education program in place at
the public school. 0 8 The New Jersey court agreed that parents ought to
have the right to remove their child from the class, bemoaning the apparent
diminution of parental authority as
"the great sovereign state forces its way
''1 9
into the home as a foster parent.
Soon thereafter, a district court in Pennsylvania considered a constitu-0
tional claim against a public junior high school in Merriken v. Cressman."
The junior high had introduced a drug abuse prevention program that
included a test aimed at identifying likely candidates for illegal drug use
and addiction. 1 Parents were given advance notice of the test, and it was
administered only to those children whose parents had affirmatively given
consent.1 2 The court determined that the consent obtained by the school

103.
Herndon, 89 F.3d at 178.
104.
See Moskowitz, supra note 22, at 624-25.
105.
Id.
106.
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
107.
Id. at 1037-38.
108.
Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 274 A.2d 832, 834 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1971).
109.
Id. at 839.
110.
Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
111.
ld. at 914.
112.
Id.
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was void because it failed to inform parents adequately of the nature of the
exam and the potential uses of the test results." 3
The court was further persuaded by the testimony of child psycholo-4
gists who warned of potentially dangerous consequences of such testing. 11
The psychologists expressed a concern that the test might function as a
self-fulfilling prophesy for a child positively identified as a likely drug
abuser. 1 5 Some children might feel an urge to use drugs in order to meet
their community's pre-formed expectations.' 6
Students who were
positively identified by the test could find themselves the objects of
derision and contempt at school. 17 Indeed, according to testifying
psychologists, even students who bowed out of taking the test, either of
their own volition or at their parents' behest, might be viewed suspiciously
as having8 something to hide, and suffer the implicit label of a future drug
abuser."1
The court also objected to the highly personal nature of the questions
posed in the questionnaire, such as whether the child felt loved at home and
whether his parents kissed him when he was small. 19 With regard to these
types of questions, the court declared that the parent-child relationship is
more deserving of constitutional protection than any other relationship,
save marriage. 120 "This court can look upon any invasion of that relationship as a direct violation of one's constitutional right to privacy."' 12' The
Pennsylvania court deemed the administration of the exam, without proper
parental permission,
an unconstitutional infringement of the right to
22
familial privacy.
Somehow, however, with the passage of a scant twenty years, the parent-child relationship became less deserving of constitutional protection. A
mere generation after Merriken, in 1995, the Sixth Circuit would consider a
parental complaint reminiscent of Merriken and blithely find no violation
of a constitutional right. 123 When a third grade boy in Michigan was
subjected to counseling and psychological testing without his parents'
permission, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court decision that the
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114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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Id.at 920.
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Merriken, 364 F. Supp. at 915.
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Id. at 918.
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Merriken, 364 F. Supp. at 922.
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parents had failed to state a claim.124 Clearly, however protective of family
autonomy American courts had been in the 1970s, by the 1990s, the mood
of the country had changed. When adjudicated in the 1990s, parental
complaints nearly identical to those litigated in the 1970s produced
conclusions diametrically opposed to decisions reached just two decades
earlier.
When parents in Boston challenged their children's mandatory participation in a sex education program far more explicit and controversial
than the program successfully evaded by parents in New Jersey in the
1970s, a court characterized their claim as an attempt to "dictate the
curriculum at the public school to which they have chosen to send their
children.' 25 The First Circuit shared neither the New Jersey court's
concern that the state was playing foster parent nor the Colorado Supreme
Court's recognition at the beginning of the century that a parent should not
be forced to choose between exercising the right to public education and
the right to control the upbringing of their child.
The Boston parents' complaint in Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Products stemmed from the failure of the school to offer parents the opportunity
26
to remove their children from a mandatory AIDS education assembly.
The tone of the assembly was intended to be accessible and entertaining,
but the result was a familiarity and vulgarity that ran contrary to the manner
in which a number of parents had planned to introduce their children to the
sensitive and private subject of sexual activity. 27 Parents claimed that by
refusing to permit them to exempt their children from the assembly, the
school had intruded upon their Fourteenth Amendment right to guide their
children's education. 128 The First Circuit's rejection of the parents'
complaint was founded on the notion that the Meyer and Pierce decisions
in no way intended the breadth of the parental authority to include the
"broad-based
right to restrict the flow of information in the public
29
schools."1
From that point on, the state would be the jealous arbiter of what to
teach the children entrusted to its public schools. Curricular choices were
increasingly off limits to parents. Even school programs with a dubious
educational function could be insulated from parental challenge by

124.
Newkirk v. E. Lansing Public Sch., No. 94-1520, 1995 WL 355664, at *1 (6th
Cir. Oct. 30, 1995).
125.
Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995).
126.
Id. at 534.
127.
See id. at 529.
128.
Id.
129.
Id. at 534.
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emphasizing their educative components. Such was the case with public
school community service requirements, popular in the 1990s. The
significance of the distinction between curricular and non-curricular school
policies is handsomely demonstrated by the Second Circuit's resolution of
one family's constitutional challenge to a mandatory community service
program in place in a New York High School.1 30 When the Immediato
family confronted their school's community service requirement, they
shrewdly sought to distinguish the service requirement from curriculum,
focusing the court's attention on the difference between the mere exposure
to information in school (clearly the purview of the state) and those
instances in which a school program requires the student to act in a manner
that may be contrary to a parent's wishes. 13' Ultimately, the claim was
unsuccessful because the Second Circuit concluded that the purpose of the
service requirement was nonetheless to teach
civic responsibility, and
1 32
therefore the program was curricular in nature.
If the 1990s came to stand for the general proposition that parents no
longer had a right to remove a child from required curricula, the case was
somewhat different when school policies unabashedly exceeded the
school's traditional mandate to teach and evaluate students' academic
progress. Sex education, though controversial and admittedly value-laden,33
is still plainly the transfer of knowledge from teacher to student.
However, when in a number of schools sex education was expanded to
include condom distribution to junior and senior high school students, there
was a distinctly extra-curricular quality to the school action. 34 The tension
between school authority and parental autonomy once again reared its ugly
head in courts across the nation. The question raised by in-school condom
distribution was whether parents can claim any greater right to control of
their children when the school moves beyond its traditional mandate to
educate and acculturate children. 35 Despite the courts' new-found
preference for public schools over parents in matters of curriculum,
deference to schools seems less appropriate when school programs exceed
the competency and mandate of schools to impart knowledge and test

130.
Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 873 F. Supp. 846 (1995).
131.
Daniel Stefaniuk, Note, No Service, No Diploma: ParentalRights Challenge to
Mandatory Community Service in Immediato v. Rye Neck School District, 14 T.M. COOLEY
L. REV. 149, 165 (1997).
132.
Immediato, 873 F. Supp. at 853.
133.
See generally Brown, 68 F.3d 525.
134.
Joseph W. Ozmer II, Note, Who's Raising the Kids: The Exclusion of Parental
Authority in Condom Distributionat Public Schools, 30 GA. L. REV. 887, 902 (1996).
135.
Id.
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student retention of that knowledge. 36 These issues were resolved, albeit
unharmoniously, in two 1990s cases.
In 1993, a New York family challenged the local public school's inschool condom distribution program, claiming an infringement of their
constitutional right to control the upbringing of their child without state
interference. 137 The New York court in Alfonzo v. Fernandez began by
recognizing parental rights as a "well recognized liberty interest[,]" thereby
triggering strict scrutiny's twin requirements: compelling state interest and
narrow tailoring.1 38 Next, the court determined that distributing condoms
in school constituted an infringement of the parental right because it
occurred in the coercive setting of mandatory public education without an
opportunity for parents to opt out.' 3 9 The court conceded that the state's
interest in preventing the spread of AIDS constituted a compelling state
interest, but concluded that in-school distribution of condoms, absent an
opt-out for
parents who object, is insufficiently narrowly tailored to meet
40
that end. 1
Just a couple of years later, however, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts considered a nearly identical condom distribution plan after
a similar parental complaint. 14
The Massachusetts court agreed that
raising a child without undue interference by the state is a fundamental
right; 142 however, unlike its New York counterpart, the Massachusetts court
was satisfied that the condom distribution program did not infringe upon
that right because there was no compulsion on the part of the state. 43 The
court reasoned that because the student was free to take or refuse a
condom, there was no state coercion. 144 The Massachusetts court was able
to avoid the application of strict scrutiny by determining that there had
been no infringement of45a parental right, because there was no compulsion
on the part of the state. 1
Despite the mounting hostility to parental autonomy claims in the
1990s, the condom distribution cases indicate that parents still had a greater
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Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
138.
Id. at 265.
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Id. at 585.
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Id. at 586.
145.
Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Due Process and Free ExerciseMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Holds that School-Based Condom ProgramDoes
Not Violate Parents' Rights, 109 HARv. L. REv. 687, 688 (1996).
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chance of prevailing over public schools when the school policy in question
exceeded mere teaching and academic testing. Under Alfonso, noncurricular school programs would have to contain a parental opt-out to pass
constitutional muster, 146 while under Curtis, no parental opt-out is required
as long as students remain free to not participate in the program. 47 Under
either standard, though, it would appear that a non-curricular program
providing neither student nor parent the opportunity to refrain from
participation could run afoul of due process protections.
IV. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE: A BOON FOR PARENTAL RIGHTS IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL CONTEXT?

The tug-o-war between parents and public schools, dramatized by the
condom distribution cases of the 1990s, remains unresolved by the
Supreme Court. 48 Nevertheless, in the 2000 term, the Court did have
occasion, in Troxel v. Granville, to address the larger question of the
propriety of state assumption of parental decision-making.149 After nearly a
century of silence on the question of parental autonomy, the Court shook
the dust from the Meyer and Pierce decisions' 50 and reaffirmed the
beleaguered due process parental right to the care, custody and control of
children. 151
Troxel concerned a dispute over the visitation rights of grandparents. 52 Tommie Granville had two daughters out of wedlock with Brad
Troxel.153 After the couple separated in 1991, Brad returned home to live
with his parents, frequently bringing his daughters to their house for
visitation.1 54 In 1993, Brad committed suicide and, soon thereafter,
Tommie resolved to reduce the frequency of her daughters' visits with their
grandparents, despite their protestations. 155 The Troxels turned to the
courts, filing suit against Tommie Granville under a Washington statute

146. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
147.
Curtis, 652 N.E.2d at 585.
148.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Curtis case. Curtis v. Sch. Comm.
of Falmouth, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996).
149.
Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
150.
Id.at 65 (resurrecting Meyer and Pierceas authority for the Troxel decision).
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152.
Id.at 68.
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154.
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that authorized the court to order visitation for any person, if,56in the court's
opinion, such visitation served the best interests of the child.
The Washington legislature had, for purposes of visitation, given the
courts power over the children of the state of Washington superior to that
of their parents.1 57 The constitutional question presented by such a broad
grant of authority was whether it could be exercised without offending
Tommie Granville's constitutional right to raise her children without undue
interference from the State.1 58 In a plurality decision penned by Justice
O'Connor, the Supreme Court determined that the Washington statute, as
applied to Tommie Granville, violated the Constitution by infringing on
Tommie's "fundamental parental right." 159 Citing to Meyer, in his
concurring opinion, Justice Souter noted that if a judge were to be
permitted to wield her authority to grant visitation of any duration to
whomever she deemed deserving, the "right of upbringing would be
[nothing more than] a sham." 160 With the law's traditional presumption
161
that a fit parent acts in the best interests of her child as its justification,
the plurality forcefully declared that under normal circumstances the State
is not entitled "to inject itself into the private realm of the family ' 162 by
163
replacing its judgment for that of a fit parent.
If there had been any doubt about the continuing vitality of Meyer and
Pierce in modem due process jurisprudence, 164 the Troxel plurality
thoroughly dispelled it. 165 Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel

may have tipped the balances in favor of parental choice even in cases
involving mandatory school policies. 166 Although the facts of the Troxel
case required the Court to resolve the relative authority of parent and state
only in the arena of custody and visitation, the plurality cited to Meyer's
holding that parents have a right to control the education of their children. 167 By unabashedly using the Meyer and Pierce education cases as
authority for its decision in a visitation dispute, the Court suggested that the
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right to parental autonomy exceeds the narrow category of custody,
extending to encompass the rights of parents in the realm of public
education. 68 Furthermore, the plurality in Troxel was particularly critical
of the district court's flouting of the venerable, though increasingly
neglected, presumption that "fit parents act in the best interests of their
children."' 69 Indeed, by reintroducing the presumption of a fit parent's
good faith in childrearing, the plurality suggested an approach to parental
rights cases not unlike the reverse rational basis standard of Meyer and
Pierce.17 Where earlier courts had required a reasonable decision on the
part of the parent, O'Connor and the plurality demanded a nearly analogous
"fitness" on the part of the parent. Once this minimal threshold is met, it
seemed, both O'Connor and her predecessors were willing to recognize the
superior authority of parent over state.
Indeed, it was just this kind of optimistic reading of Troxel that
spawned a spate of law review articles sporting such up-beat titles as "The
New Era of Parental Autonomy."''
Certainly in Illinois, the earliest
indications were that parents had won a broad and substantial victory in
Troxel.172 Just on the heels of the Troxel decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court entertained a parental challenge to the constitutionality of a thirdparty visitation statute in Lulay v. Lulay. 173 The Illinois Supreme Court
deemed the statute an unconstitutional infringement of parents' fundamental liberty interest in controlling the upbringing of their children. 174 Despite
scholarly concerns that the Troxel decision had avoided the term "fundamental right"'' 75 and was resolved without explicit reference to the level of
scrutiny applied, 176 the Lulay decision cites directly to Troxel for the
proposition that parental autonomy is a fundamental right triggering strict
77
scrutiny. 1

However, the conclusion that strict scrutiny should be applied to infringements of parental rights in visitation cases 78 did not mean that courts
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would find strict scrutiny appropriate in the public school context. 79
Predictably, Troxel had no impact on the resolution of conflicts over
mandatory course requirements. In the Second Circuit, the court made the
narrow determination, even post-Troxel, that when "parents seek .. to
exempt a child from an educational requirement

. . .

rational basis review

applies."'' 80 In Leebaert v. Harrington,a father sought to exempt his son
from a sex education class,' 81 failing as miserably post-Troxel
as those who
82
had mounted challenges to mandatory courses in the 1990s.1

Clearly, Troxel had not managed to turn back the clock to 1971 when
sex education was regarded as a personal matter that parents had the right
to control. Moreover, in Vines v. Board of Education of Zion School
District, an Illinois case, the court recognized Troxel, but found that
rational basis was the appropriate standard in determining the constitutionality of a school uniform policy.183 However, what is intriguing about these

apparently unsuccessful post-Troxel public education cases is the specificity with which the lower courts felt compelled to identify the kind of
parental interest that merits only rational basis review. While both of these
courts determined that a rational basis standard applies, both narrowly
confined rational basis review to parental rights in the public school
context, specifically as they relate to either dress codes or the flow of
information in the public school.
In C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education, a U.S. district court considered a school administered questionnaire that posed highly personal
questions, the results of which were to be used in aggregate to aid in the
development of community programs. 184 The court found no constitutional
violation because of the voluntary nature of the questionnaire. 85 Before
the questionnaire was administered, parents were notified and given an
opportunity to assess the questionnaire.186 The court acknowledged that the
information gathered by the questionnaire was precisely the kind that is
entitled to privacy protection, but was satisfied that there had been no
invasion of privacy because the information was available only in "non-

179.
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identifiable, aggregated form."'' 87 Furthermore, the court inferred that
parents would have understood from the school mailings about the
questionnaires that failure to respond constituted an implicit agreement to
the administration of the questionnaire to their children.' 88 The court
concluded that a "voluntary, anonymous survey made with notice of optout possibilities to parents" does not constitute an intrusion into the
constitutionally protected right to raise a child without governmental
interference. 89 The value of this decision for proponents of parental rights
is this: in finding a school action constitutional, the court chose to hang its
hat on the notice and opt-out provision granted to parents and the anonymous nature of the survey.
A voluntary survey was at issue in Fields v. Palmdale School District
as well.' 90 In Fields, elementary school children were asked to respond to a
survey featuring explicit questions about sex.191 The purpose of the survey,
announced in the parental consent form, was to gather community-wide
information about the exposure of children to trauma. 192 Some parents
claimed that the explicit nature of the questions violated their fundamental
right to introduce their children to sexual matters as they saw fit, without
interference from the State. 93 Having framed their interest in terms of
control of the flow of information, the California parents virtually sealed
their fate. The court naturally analogized their claim to that of the parents
in Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions,Inc. 194 As a result, the court
merely reiterated Brown's position that the right to parental control of a
child's education does not encompass the right to control the flow of
95
information in public schools. 1
The circumstances were much different in the Seventh Circuit case of
Doe v. Heck, in which county caseworkers responded to rumors of corporal
punishment at a private Christian elementary school by conducting
interviews about corporal punishment with students without the consent of
their parents. 196 The parents claimed that the caseworkers' conduct
constituted a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to "familial
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relations."' 97 The Seventh Circuit averred that after Troxel it was not clear
what level of scrutiny ought to be applied in such cases, but claimed that
Troxel made it clear that some form of heightened scrutiny is required and
opted for a balancing test. 198
V. PARENTAL RIGHTS AND THE CHILDREN'S
MENTAL HEALTH ACT OF 2003
The Children's Mental Health Act of 2003 comprises a comprehensive plan for improving the provision of mental health services to Illinois
children. 99 Section 15 of the Act addresses the role of public schools in
the overall statutory scheme. 200 The language of Section 15(b), as it relates
to the development of school policy, reads as follows:
Every Illinois school district shall develop a policy for incorporating social and emotional development into the district's educational program. The policy shall address
teaching and assessing social and emotional skills and protocols for responding to children with social, emotional, or
mental health problems, or a combination of such problems, that impact learning ability.2 °'
Section 15 clearly lays out three distinct types of action which Illinois
school districts must take in order to comply with the statute: curricular
revisions to include the teaching of emotional skills, the assessment of
emotional skills, and the development of procedures for responding to
students with identified problems.
The first prong of the policy concerns the inclusion of social and emotional health as components of health education.20 3 Certainly emotional
health-like sex education-is a sensitive and value-laden subject, and
some parents will inevitably object to the State's characterization of good
emotional health; 204 nonetheless, any parental challenge to this educative
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component of the statutory mandate is likely to suffer the fate met by
parental challenges to sex education. By determining what children ought
to study, the school is operating well within its area of expertise and is
doing nothing more than exercising its essential mandate to teach.2 °5 Time
and again, American courts have emphatically told parents that the
Constitution affords no parental right to control the flow of information
2 °6
(including state-adopted value judgments) to students in public schools.
Just as the parental challenge to the sex education program reviewed in the
Second Circuit's Leebaert v. Harringtonmerited only rational basis review,
so too will the inclusion of emotional health standards in the health
curriculum.2 °7

What exactly is contemplated, however, by the statutory mandate that
such policies also address "assessing social and emotional skills" ' 20 8 is less
clear and potentially of greater constitutional concern to parents. It is
unquestionably the prerogative of public schools to "test" their students; 2° 9
however, traditional academic testing (Can the student define depression?)
and psychological testing (Is this student at risk for depression?) are two
very distinct matters. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the language in the
Pierce decision, affirming a school's authority to test its students, applies to
the latter variety of testing. The statute itself does not explicitly indicate
which type of assessment is intended; however, the ordinary standard of
statutory interpretation is to read the statute as a whole, construing the
meaning of each provision in relation to the others.21 0 Using this approach,
the very existence of the third component of Section 15's mandate strongly
suggests that schools will be involved in the latter, non-academic,
therapeutic type of assessment. Section 15's third prong calls for the
development of school procedures for responding to students with
identified social and emotional problems. 21 1 If the separate components of
section 15 are read together as an integrated scheme, then it is most logical
to conclude that the purpose of the assessment requirement is to identify
those students to whom the response mandated by the third requirement
will apply.
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While the statutory language calling for "assessing social and emotional skills" ' 21 2 might conceivably refer to the assessment of mere
knowledge rather than personal development, such an interpretation seems
strange in light of the mandated protocols for school response. Indeed, the
standards developed by the Illinois State Board of Education, pursuant to
the Children's Mental Health Act, include not just purely academic goals,
but behavioral goals as well.21 3 Goal Three, for example, concerns
responsible behaviors in the school and community contexts.21 4 To
satisfactorily reach this goal, students at the early high school level are
expected to "evaluate how social norms and the expectations of authority
influence personal decisions and actions ' 21 5 (a clearly academic exercise)
and also to "demonstrate personal responsibility in making ethical
decisions ' '216 (an evaluation of conduct). Similarly, early elementary
school children are not only expected be able to identify the types of
decisions students make at school, but also to "make positive choices when
interacting with classmates. 2 7
Given this interpretation, this portion of Section 15 of the Children's
Mental Health Act of 2003, calling for assessments of a student's emotional and social development, has a decidedly non-curricular tenor. By
characterizing the purpose of the assessments as something more than
educative, it becomes possible to remove the constitutional analysis from
that cluster of cases--categorically relegated to mere rational basis
review-involving purely educational school policies. However, even
where such extra-curricular school programs are concerned, three levels of
judicial scrutiny are still possible options in the post-Troxel environment:
rational basis review, strict scrutiny, and the intermediate Seventh Circuit
approach of Doe v. Heck.21 8' Rational basis review is nearly always the
death knell for constitutional challenges as the overwhelming majority of
statutes are upheld under this lax standard,2 19 while strict scrutiny deemed
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"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact ' 220 spells the almost certain downfall of
the challenged law.22' Whether the parental interest in guiding a child's
emotional health without state interference is more readily analogized to
claims that have been deemed worthy of strict scrutiny or to those destined
for rational basis review is therefore of paramount importance to the
likelihood of vindication.
After Troxel, school uniform policies, though not curricular, have
merited only rational basis review.22 2 It is difficult to imagine, though, that
a parent's desire to guide the emotional and social development of a child
could be viewed by courts as analogous to the arguably trivial parental
desire to encourage independent choice of clothing. The consequences of
permitting the school to make preliminary determinations of emotional
health are enormous by comparison. Standards for emotional health are
necessarily social constructs 223 which some parents may not share with the
State. Furthermore, the stigma that attaches to a determination of mental
illness is so great 224 that parents may wish either to avoid subjecting a child
to majority notions of mental health 225 or may prefer to keep information
about potential emotional problems out of the hands of the state altogether.2 26
Unlike the stable and universally accepted standards for routine inschool vision screening and hearing tests, standards for what constitutes
emotional health are fluid and hotly debated. The most dramatic example
of the rapidly changing and still widely contested characterization of
optimal emotional health concerns homosexuality.22 7 Just thirty years ago,
the American Psychiatric Association included homosexuality as a
category of mental illness,228 while today the Association, in keeping with
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changes in societal attitudes, no longer views homosexuality as a pathology.22 9 Just as some parents in the 1970's may have been sufficiently
progressive in their views of sexual identity to spare their homosexual
adolescents the indignity of enduring the label of mental illness, there may
be other contemporary notions of emotional disturbance held by the
majority that, in the eyes of some parents, are well within the continuum of
emotional health. If the state is permitted to make a preliminary assessment of a child's emotional health, it has usurped the parents' right to
subscribe to that definition of mental health that best suits their cultural and
religious conceptions of emotional well-being.
Moreover, even for parents who are in full agreement with the State's
definition of emotional wellness, the stigma attached to designations (or
even mere intimations) of emotional illness is reason enough for parents to
prefer to deal with a child's emotional development without the involvement of the state-run school.23 ° In a society in which the stigma of mental
illness has historically resulted in limitations on employment and housing 231 a parent might reasonably anticipate that an affirmative indication of
emotional illness in a school screening might lead to diminished educational or extra-curricular opportunities at school. In one scholarly study
concerning prevailing societal attitudes towards the mentally ill, respondents indicated that they viewed the emotionally ill as dangerous and
inherently less capable of managing their affairs.232 It is surely to be
expected that some parents might prefer to spare a child coping with
emotional problems from the added injury of being perceived by teachers
and school administrators in this light.
The parental interest in managing a child's emotional health without
interference from the State takes on even greater weight given the variety
of attitudes toward mental illness among America's many ethnic, racial and
religious minorities. For a number of ethnic minorities, the burden of
undergoing a government-mandated emotional health assessment may be
exceptionally onerous because of culturally determined sensitivities to
questions of mental illness. 2 33 In general, Hispanics and Asian Americans
attach a comparatively stronger stigma to mental illness. 234 One study
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indicates, for example, that only twelve percent of the Asian Americans
interviewed felt comfortable sharing an emotional health concern with a
friend.23 5
Asians, as a group, are typically uncomfortable sharing information
about emotional problems, and function under a culturally-determined
belief that it is inappropriate to discuss emotional problems outside the
family. 236 Furthermore, the kind of personal questions that are commonly
part of such assessments are anathema to many Asian cultures in which it is
inappropriate to express an opinion about oneself compared to others.237
Indeed, in Asian cultures, a diagnosis of mental illness is thought to reflect
so poorly on the family that it is perceived that the prospects for marriage
and economic opportunity of all family members will be adversely
affected.23 8
It is not uncommon for immigrant and refugee populations, having
recently escaped oppressive political regimes, to have a profound fear of
any type of governmental intrusion into their private lives. 239 For these
populations, in-school emotional health assessments could be particularly
onerous.
Moreover, because no culturally unbiased assessment tool is possible, 240 it is inevitable that some ethnic and cultural groups will more
frequently come up short as a result of culturally biased assessment
standards. 241 Appropriate and healthy behaviors are culturally determined,
resulting in profound variations in the manner in which emotional illness
presents itself from culture to culture.24 2 An understanding of cultural
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differences is central to proper assessments.24 3 In Filipino culture, for
example, losing face-a thoroughly foreign concept to most Americansmay be the cause of a social withdrawal that in Western culture would be
interpreted as a sign of a biologically-based mental disturbance. 244 In
American schools that increasingly value gender equality, it is easily
245 and marianismo 246 might
conceivable that Hispanic notions of machismo
247
aberrations.
register as developmental
Religious differences present yet another minefield for faulty assessments. 248 Religion plays a significant role in defining appropriate social
behavior and gender roles.249 In largely protestant America, some Hispanic
Catholic children may entertain beliefs that would seem positively
delusional to one unfamiliar with Catholic culture.2 5 ° Some minority
religious rituals are susceptible to misinterpretation in the United States,
even by a sophisticated and trained psychologist, as compulsions or
phobias. 25 ' When an orthodox Muslim male student assiduously avoids
physical contact with fellow female students, according to the dictates of
his religion, an outsider, unschooled in the mores of Islamic culture, might
mistakenly find a social anxiety disorder. 2 Similar misunderstandings can
result from an outsider's observance of an orthodox Jew or orthodox
Muslim's fastidious adherence to the dietary restrictions placed upon them
by their religious convictions.25 3 The painstaking attention to cleanliness
required by religious dietary laws could easily strike an unsuspecting
Anglo-American as indications of an obsessive-compulsive disorder. 2
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The shifting nature of any standard of emotional health, the necessarily culturally biased (and therefore faulty) tools that are available for
making assessments, and the profound stigma that attaches to even the hint
of emotional illness all must be considered when deciding whether a
parent's interest in guiding the emotional development of a child is any
more deserving of constitutional protection than the unsuccessfully asserted
parental interest in encouraging free choice of school clothing. In terms of
what is at stake for parents and their children, the potential consequences of
in-school emotional assessments find an analogy more readily with cases
addressing similarly invasive school programs rather than with school
uniform policies.
The emotional health testing proposed by the Illinois legislature, as
well as the concerns raised by such in-school tests, find more apt parallels
in the Merriken case decided favorably for parental rights in the 1970s. 25
Merriken also involved a well-intentioned, but highly intrusive, assessment
designed to identify and benefit troubled students. 6 Indeed, the test
administered in Merriken was a particular form of psychological assessment, aimed at identifying potentially addictive personalities.25 7 Questions
about the potential uses of the information gleaned from the tested students
in Merriken25 8 present themselves with equal force under the Illinois
statute. Indeed, all of the Merriken Court's concerns about the potential
psychological ramifications for positively identified students apply to
students singled out by emotional health assessments in Illinois. The selffulfilling prophecy feared by the Merriken Court, as well as the potential
for ridicule and derision at school 259 also resonate in the context of inschool emotional health assessments in Illinois. Finally, the Merriken
court's conclusion that even children who opted out of the testing might be
viewed with suspicion by classmates ought to be considered when
determining whether the inclusion of an opt-out provision (available to
either the child or the parent) is sufficient to support a judicial conclusion
that state-mandated testing does not implicate the right to parental
autonomy. 26
At first glance, the post-Troxel cases of Fields v. Palmdale School
Districtand C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education might appear to speak
to the issues presented by emotional health assessments. The school
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actions in both of these cases involved soliciting sensitive information from
students, and yet both cases avoided close judicial scrutiny. However, in
the Ridgewood case, the information gathered in the questionnaires was
anonymously provided, and could have no negative impact on participating
students.26 ' In Fields, the survey was also intended to provide information
about the community as a whole, and not about individual students.262
Furthermore, the parents' complaint in Fields focused on the information
the testing exposed their children to, not the coerced revelation of private
family matters. 263
If a parental rights challenge can evade rational basis review by emphasizing the unavoidably invasive quality of emotional assessments in
contrast to the minimally intrusive nature of the policies that courts have
been content to examine under the lax rational basis standard, then two
variants of heightened scrutiny remain: courts might either apply the
traditional strict scrutiny analysis (as the Seventh Circuit did in Lulay) 264 or
the balancing test laid out in Doe v. Heck.265
Under the two-part strict scrutiny test, school-based emotional health
assessments could only pass constitutional muster by showing that the state
has a compelling interest in the healthy emotional and social development
of America's children, and then by proving that in-school assessments are
narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.26 Courts have recognized the
prevention of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases as a genuinely
compelling state interest,267 and it seems most likely that American courts
would likewise recognize the state's interest in promoting the emotional
health of its children.
The question of narrow tailoring is frequently framed as follows: Does
the administration of in-school emotional assessments achieve the ends
legitimately sought by the state in the manner least restrictive of a parent's
right to childrearing control and family privacy? 268 Advocates of parents'
rights can mount a formidable argument that it does not: the Illinois
Children's Mental Health Partnership, the entity responsible for drawing up
the preliminary plan for the implementation of the statutory goals of the
Children's Mental Health Act of 2003, proposes, of its own accord, a
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substantially less restrictive means of achieving the state's goal. The
preliminary plan, submitted to Governor Blagojevich in September of
2004, calls for the incorporation of mental health evaluations in the routine
physical examinations already required of Illinois school children prior to
kindergarten, fourth, and ninth grades. 269 By incorporating the assessments
into physical examinations, parents could exercise greater control by
choosing a physician, perhaps one familiar with the cultural, religious and
class affiliations of the family. If necessary, parents would be free to seek
a second opinion. Furthermore, parents and students could decide for
themselves whether to share the doctor's conclusions about the student's
emotional development with the school or to address the problems without
school involvement. While protecting the familial privacy of Illinois
parents and children, these evaluations-privately and professionally
conducted--could satisfy the state's interest in assuring that Illinois
children have a clean bill of emotional health. This is the less restrictive
alternative (already approved by the state) that could be used to defeat the
constitutionality of in-school assessments under strict scrutiny.
In the alternative, if, as some commentators argue, Troxel constitutes
an implicit rejection of strict scrutiny 270 in favor of a new balancing test for
family privacy cases, then the test created by the Seventh Circuit in Doe v.
Heck affords an appropriate model.27 ' If this model were used, parents
seeking to challenge in-school emotional health assessments would need to
convince a court that the balance of the four factors dictated by Heck weigh
in favor of protecting the parent's liberty interest. 272 The first prong of the
balancing test, the nature of the interest at stake, ought to work in favor of
the parents. The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to
reject medical treatment, suggesting that the Court holds autonomous
decision-making in the realm of health in high regard.273 In order to make
the second prong-the nature of the intrusion-weigh in their favor,
parents could use the arguments from Merriken that students, being at an
impressionable age, could fall victim to self-fulfilling prophecies when
positively identified as at risk in emotional assessments. 274 The third
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prong, the urgency of the state interest, could arguably weigh in favor of
constitutionality, given that government studies indicate that mental illness
strikes one in ten children.275 Finally, using this comment's discussion of
the inevitably imperfect assessment tools available, it can be credibly
argued that the effectiveness of the means chosen-the fourth prong-is
low. Three of the four prongs weigh in favor of recognizing the superiority
of the parental interest over the state.
VI. CONCLUSION

Mental illness is real, and it afflicts children as readily as adults.276
While the State undoubtedly has an interest in promoting the healthy social
and emotional development of its children, parents have a countervailing
interest in making a private and personal determination with their children
about what constitutes good emotional health and how much information
the family would like to share with the school. The right to autonomous
parenting is an integral part of the historical traditions of American culture,
enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nearly a
century ago,277 and reaffirmed by Troxel v. Granville in the 2000 term.27 8
Although there is certainly no agreement, even post-Troxel, that state
statutes bearing on all parental rights should be subjected to heightened
scrutiny, the Supreme Court has left the door open, and lower courts are not
barred from employing heightened scrutiny for school policies that go
beyond teaching and touch upon sensitive and personal issues. The
emotional development of children is a highly sensitive concern of parents,
and when legislators begin to insinuate themselves into this private area,
courts should demand more than a mere rational basis justification.
"The child is not the mere creature of the State" observed the Supreme
Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.279 Yet a historical overview of the
struggle between parents and schools for authority over children suggests
that parents have lost considerable ground, and children have become
creatures of the state to a degree previously unimaginable. According to
conventional parenting wisdom, children must be given responsibility in

275.

Report of the Surgeon General's Conference on Children's Mental Health: A

National Agenda, available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/cmh/childreport.htm
(last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
See id.
276.
277.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 390-91 (1923).
278.
Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
279.

2005]

245

BRAVF NEWSCHOOL

order to learn to accept accountability for their actions. Similarly, a society
that values responsible parenting should take a stand against the insidious
shifting of parental responsibilities to the State.
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